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6 Reconfiguring the public of science 
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent 
Université Paris 1 and Institut universitaire de France 
Abstract This paper reconsiders recent changes in science–public relations in 
France in the light of earlier ideas about the role of the lay public. A broad histori-
cal perspective shows that the categories used to describe communications be-
tween knowledge producers and society have been reconfigured again and again 
(Secord 2004). Notions such as such as ‘savants’ and ‘amateurs’, ‘popular sci-
ence’ and ‘science mediation’ are historical constructions heavily dependent on 
the institutional conditions of scientific research and on its technological applica-
tions (Topham 2009ab). This paper first emphasizes the epistemic and social con-
ditions of the construction of the notion of the public as ‘those who do not know’ 
in the 20th century. It then tries to understand when and how the notions of ‘citi-
zen science’ and ‘participatory science’ emerged. Finally, through a brief survey 
of various modes of participation developed over the past decade, it questions the 
notion of a radical change or paradigm shift.  
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6.1 The construction of the deficient public 
Over the past century, science and society issues have been framed around the ev-
idence of a divide between scientists and the lay public. There were two entities: 
the small scientific elite—the ‘savants’—on the one hand, and the mass of those 
who do not know—the ‘ignorants’—on the other.2 All efforts at popularizing sci-
ence were aimed at bridging an increasing gulf between scientists and the public. 
The popularization enterprise was thus considered as a necessary consequence of 
the progress of science. 
Since the late 20th century, new catchwords such as ‘citizen science’ and ‘pub-
lic engagement in science’ have spread around Europe. Suddenly the public seems 
to be allowed to have a say about scientific and technological topics. So striking is 
the change that historians and social scientists describe this episode as a paradigm 
shift: from a deficit model—in which the public was defined negatively as ‘those 
who do not know’—to the participatory model—in which the public is invited to 
take part in the scientific enterprise (Broks 2006, Schiele 2008). 
                                                            
2 See, for instance, Raichvarg & Jacques (1991). 
2 
 
How are we to understand this changing image of the public of science? 
In the 20th century, it was tacitly assumed that the progress of science has a 
cost: most people—99% of the population—are left behind. And the challenge 
was to bridge the gap through campaigns of popularization. In 1939 the author of 
the article ‘La vulgarisation scientifique’ in the Encyclopédie française insisted on 
the increasing difficulty of the task of science popularization: 
Jadis le problème (de la vulgarisation) aurait été facile car la science était peu 
avancée, les savants étaient des amateurs et il y avait peu d’écart de culture entre eux 
et les gens du monde. En outre la langue qu’ils parlaient était la même. Aujourd’hui 
l’abîme s’est creusé entre les créateurs de la science et l’homme moyen. Etroitement 
cantonnés, les savants sont d’autant moins compris qu’ils ont un vocabulaire et des 
tours d’expression particuliers. Le nombre des faits et de principes qu’il faut 
connaître pour suivre l’évolution d’une science est considérable et l’apprentissage est 
rebutant. Tout concourt à rendre la vulgarisation difficile. (Sudre 1939)3 
In surveying the changing relations between science and the public over time, 
Sudre distinguished three periods. In the dawn of modern science, the scientist and 
the layman differed only in their style of argumentation, and Descartes’ or New-
ton’s cosmologies were popularized in the salons. Later on, according to Sudre, 
the increased formalization and mathematization of science in the 19th century 
created a difference of language: translation was needed, from the scientific lan-
guage into ordinary language. Popularization thus developed as a process of trans-
lation. It was still possible to bridge the gap. 
The 19th century was admittedly the golden age of popular science. Science 
magazines, science museums and popular science publications were booming in 
France and many industrialized countries (Bensaude-Vincent & Rasmussen 1997, 
Bensaude Vincent 2009). This mass consumption of science was enabled by mate-
rial conditions, such as new techniques of printing, cheap presses, railways, and 
greater literacy among the population. Yet it also presupposed that the distance be-
tween the scientific elite and the public could be overcome. The continuity be-
tween science and common sense was the basic assumption, underlying and even 
inspiring most 19th century popular enterprises.4 The gap between scientists and 
the public was viewed as accidental rather than essential and did not disqualify the 
public’s knowledge. Laypeople had to catch up, to follow the progress of science 
and technology, which was assimilated with the progress of civilization itself.  
In the early 20th century, after the development of relativity theory and quan-
tum mechanics, Sudre continued, translations from scientific language into ver-
nacular language were no longer possible because the notions introduced by phys-
icists had no equivalent in the common intuition of space and time. Scientists and 
ordinary people lived in two different worlds. An ontological gulf came into be-
ing: no common reference allowed the process of translation. This radical break 
                                                            
3 See also Bensaude-Vincent (2001a). 
4 This credo has been clearly formulated by Auguste Comte. Positive science, in contrast 
to metaphysics, emerged out of common sense. See Bensaude-Vincent (1991). 
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between science and the public threatened the popularization agenda: to put ‘sci-
ence in every one’s reach’. 
In the interwar period, the ‘new physics’—relativity theory and quantum me-
chanics—became favourite topics of science popularization despite the assump-
tion of an ontological gap. In fact, as the ‘science = progress of civilization’ equa-
tion became less and less obvious in the aftermath of World War I, popularizers 
had to promote the notion of pure and disinterested science. Star scientists were 
celebrated as geniuses concerned with the pursuit of truth, living in a spiritual 
world, ignoring economic interests and national boundaries. Science was beyond 
good and evil, beyond moral judgements. Theoretical physics became the model 
science, and the distance between science and common sense became a cliché. 
Gaston Bachelard’s epistemology of rupture was largely inspired by this cam-
paign. With non-Euclidian geometries, relativity theory and quantum mechanics, 
the ‘new scientific spirit’ required a radical break with common-sense views.5 So 
distorted were the non-scientists’ views that they had better keep silent and never 
express their opinion. Immanuel Kant’s famous injunction ‘Sapere aude’ (‘Dare to 
know!’ (Kant 1784)—never rely on others’ opinions but cultivate your own facul-
ty of judgement—no longer made sense. Laypeople would necessarily have to rely 
on experts. Ironically, a direct impact of the advancement of scientific rationality 
was the collapse of the Enlightenment motto ‘Have the courage to use your own 
understanding.’ 
How to understand this paradox? The notion of laypeople as deprived of sci-
ence is a social construction linked to a specific practice of science. Whereas sci-
ence in the 18th century was a social activity open to amateurs, in the 20th century 
lay practices of science, popular and indigenous knowledge have been disqualified 
as pseudo-sciences. Legitimate science is the specific practice of academic com-
munities working in public or private research laboratories, and ruled by their own 
systems of values and evaluation (the peer review system). As a result, non-
scientists could never challenge the authority of professional scientists.  
Could that authority be challenged by science mediators—those who occupied 
the allegedly increasing gap between science and the public? Science writers and 
journalists became professionals in charge of spreading an image of science 
among the public, rather than enlightening the public (LaFollette 1990). In the af-
termath of World War II, they very efficiently spread a positive image of nuclear 
physics as a source of clean and cheap power rather than as a military weapon. 
However, dazzling images meant to reinforce the public acceptance and accla-
mation of scientific research did nothing to bridge the gulf between scientists and 
the public. In the 1980s, alarming surveys of the public understanding of science 
in industrialized countries raised a political concern to increase ‘scientific’ litera-
cy. The mission of science mediators was to augment public knowledge of scien-
                                                            
5 In 1938, Bachelard presented opinion as the major obstacle to the ‘formation of scien-
tific spirit’. He even deprived laypeople of their capacities for thinking and judging 
(‘l’opinion pense mal, elle ne pense pas’) (Bachelard 1972:14). 
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tific topics—to spread scientific rationality within society. The mission was never 
to open the scientists’ minds to other forms of rationality and other styles of think-
ing. It was a one-way flow from the source of knowledge production to the mass 
of knowledge users and consumers.  
6.2 The erosion of the ‘gulf’ between science and 
the public 
Some protests emerged from within the scientific community in the 1970s. For in-
stance, the ‘scientific culture’ movement denounced the increasing isolation of 
science from culture and society, while the ‘science for the people’ movement in 
the United Kingdom and ‘Impa-science’ in France debunked claims of neutrality 
(Debailly 2010). In the 1980s, the prestige and the authority of science started to 
come under attack from the public.  
On one shore of the alleged ‘gulf’, the monopoly of expertise was questioned 
as a result of a number of public scandals, which brought to centre stage the collu-
sion of interests between the scientific establishment and public or private inter-
ests. In France, during the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the public authorities sys-
tematically denied that radioactivity on French territory had increased. They 
assumed that the radioactive cloud had stopped at the German and Italian borders 
and took no steps to prohibit the consumption of milk and vegetables. This at-
tempt, against all factual evidence, to assuage the public’s fears only generated 
public mistrust of both scientists and politicians. 
That mistrust has since been deepened by revelations about deliberate attempts 
to conceal or dismiss certain data for economic reasons. For instance, the tobacco 
industry concealed or denied epidemiological data about the danger involved in 
smoking (Proctor & Schiebinger 2008). The attitude of Monsanto in the contro-
versy surrounding genetically modified crops and, more recently, the disclosure of 
the risks associated with Bisphenol A have reinforced the public’s conviction that 
commercial interests permeate and distort all scientific data (Robin 2008). 
More widely spread is the growing scepticism about climate change. Despite a 
growing consensus among experts about climate change and its anthropic origin, 
doubts are widely publicized in order to prevent governments taking effective 
countermeasures (Oreskes & Conway 2010). 
As a result of so many controversial affairs, science could hardly be considered 
as a value-free, neutral activity transcending power and ideologies. Instead, there 
is wide support in public opinion for a view of science as a domain dominated by 
economic interests and political orientations. For many people, all expertise is bi-
ased and the selection of experts is a political decision. The age of experts as those 
who ‘speak truth to power’ seems to be over (Jasanoff 2003). 
On the other shore of the ‘gulf’, the view of the public as a mass of passive re-
ceivers of innovation has been eroded by a number of spectacular actions. In Ger-
many, the anti-nuclear movement opposed the construction of nuclear plants, 
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stopped trains shipping nuclear waste, and organized protest sit-ins.  In France, 
massive public protests against genetically modified organisms and the destruction 
of genetically modified trial crops have led to a temporary moratorium on the 
planting of Monsanto MON810 genetically modified corn. In 2006, the opening of 
Minatec, a big research centre in Grenoble dedicated to nanotechnology and neu-
roscience, spurred intense protests from a local organization named ‘Pièce et main 
d’oeuvre’. This small group of determined, anonymous activists, using more or 
less humorous denunciations of the local lobby, drew public attention to the non-
democratic nature of decisions and investments in nanotechnology. The group’s 
purpose is to systematically debunk all research initiatives in nanotechnology and 
related technologies.  
More constructive actions demonstrated that laypeople can produce legitimate 
knowledge. An early example of co-production of knowledge was in AIDS re-
search. Patients contributed to experimental investigations—even conducting clin-
ical trials on a specific drug after scientists had refused to do so (Epstein 1995, 
1996). In France, a civil association was created in the aftermath of Chernobyl to 
challenge radiation measurements delivered by official institutions. Twenty-five 
years later, CRIIRAD (the Commission of Independent Research and Information 
on Radioactivity) is a legitimate non-profit organization in charge of risk surveil-
lance and public information, equipped with permanent laboratories run by a doz-
en permanent employees supported by thousands of volunteers (Topçu 2008). An-
other civil counterexpertise organization based on that model—CRIIGEN (the 
Commission of Independent Research and Information on Genetic Engineering)—
was founded in 1999. However, it is more like a group of experts-acting-as-
citizens who develop an alternative approach to the risks and benefits of genetic 
engineering. Its results are periodically under attack and its members 
aredenounced as impostors or charlatans because they directly question the inde-
pendence of academic research.  
As a result of scandals and controversies about nuclear power, genetic engi-
neering, nanotechnology and climate change, the clear-cut boundary between sci-
ence and opinion collapsed in a few decades. The polarized landscape, with a 
small scientific elite holding a monopoly of truth language on the one hand, and a 
passive public submitting to the authority of experts on the other, has been deeply 
questioned. Science is now increasingly viewed as an archipelago of scattered is-
lands populated by experts, as scientific controversies between experts on issues 
such as genetically modified crops and climate change have become more and 
more commonplace. Experts do not speak with a single voice and cannot reach a 
consensus. Although the English language has no plural for the abstract noun ‘ex-
pertise’, the plurality of expert opinions has been recognized (Bucchi & Neresini 
2004, Bucchi & Trench 2008). And the public itself is no longer seen as an ab-
stract entity, a mass of anonymous laypeople. They are individuals defending their 
interests and capable of producing knowledge. They are citizens aware of their 
rights. The erosion of the image of the gulf is so pronounced that the issue ‘sci-
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ence and the public’ has been reformulated in terms of ‘citizen science’ (Ir-
win 1995). 
6.3 The collapse of the ivory tower 
The divide between scientists and the public could be maintained as long as sci-
ence was perceived as a separate world, independent of the context in which it was 
practised. Scientific research, confined in closed laboratories, was supposed to be 
ruled exclusively by epistemic values such as truth, objectivity, and so on. How-
ever, the recent controversies (genetically modified organisms, climate change, 
personalized medicine, etc.) have revealed the social and political dimensions of 
scientific issues. Over the past two decades, social scientists have described sci-
ence as highly context-sensitive and permeated by non-epistemic values such as 
‘competitiveness’ or ‘sustainable development’ (Longino 1990, Gibbons et al. 
1994). 
Whether this is or is not a ‘new regime of knowledge production’ is a matter of 
debate, but what really matters is that officially science is no longer pursued as a 
disinterested and value-free activity. The dominant view in science policy is that 
scientific research is not an end in itself—it is oriented towards society and the 
economy. Science is no longer ‘the endless frontier’, as it was in Vannevar Bush’s 
famous 1945 programme, which gave considerable autonomy to scientists. ‘Socie-
ty is the endless frontier’ is the European vision of research and innovation for the 
21st century (Caracostas & Muldur 1997). Over the past two decades, technosci-
ences such as information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology have 
developed in parallel with the urge to refocus science on social concerns. Sudden-
ly, the ivory tower of academic research opened to the world. Science policy be-
came a major actor, and a crowd of industrial people, venture capitalists, users’ 
groups, consumer associations, environmental activists, trade unions and NGOs 
came to the front of the stage and talked about science.  
Along with the reorientation of scientific research towards societal or economic 
demands, the practice of science broke the walls within the ivory tower. Multidis-
ciplinary research networks working for a few years on a specific research project 
tend to dissolve the strong disciplinary identities of academic scientists. They have 
to raise funds and make alliances with other laboratories, industrial companies and 
banks. They have to behave as entrepreneurs rather than comply with the tradi-
tional scientific ethos defined by the four pillars (universalism, disinterestedness, 
communalism, organized scepticism) (Merton 1973). In addition, the increasing 
role of computers, computer-based modelling and simulation is changing the epis-
temic culture deeply. In research fields such as genomics, investigations are aimed 
at the collection of innumerable data rather than the search for universal laws of 
nature. And computer sciences in their historical development have been much 
more open than conventional disciplines to amateur practices. Not only have 
hackers, free software and open source movements demonstrated that sound 
knowledge can be produced outside academic circles, but academic circles are oc-
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casionally inviting amateurs to participate in their research, as exemplified by 
Stanford University’s Folding@home project, which was launched to solve a 
problem related to protein folding. New epistemic cultures, such as distributed 
computational research or crowdsourcing for enrolling young talent in the explora-
tion of new research areas, are emerging, blurring the traditional boundaries be-
tween academics and amateurs. 
Does this mean that the age of experts and technocrats is over and that science 
is now more in the hands of citizens and under democratic control?  
6.4 Towards a participatory model? 
Science policymakers, NGOs and scientific communities seem to agree that more 
control of science is needed. They are increasingly concerned with frauds and con-
flicts of interests and call for more transparency. The concept of accountability, in-
troduced in the 18th century to make the apparatus of government answerable to 
the public, has resurfaced as a major requirement for scientists in the late 
20th century. Public investments in scientific research have to be legitimated, and 
scientific activities have to be scrutinized by public authorities. Social scientists 
have been engaged in a number of national research initiatives on nanotechnology 
or biotechnology. ‘Responsible innovation’ has become a catchphrase both in in-
dustrial research and in the public domain. Society, it seems, has to be present 
from the outset, upstream, on the laboratory floor. 
In stark contrast to the former one-way science communication model, an im-
pressive number of dispositifs have been developed to initiate a two-way traffic 
between citizens and scientists. Science cafes, public debates, consensus confer-
ences, citizen conferences or juries, scenario workshops and hybrid forums are 
routinely organized in many European countries. The cafés des sciences recreate 
the public space where the notion of ‘the public’ emerged in the Enlightenment. In 
the standard process of a citizen conference, a panel of citizens is asked to formu-
late its opinion about a scientific or technological topic after hearing a number of 
experts and their opinions; its recommendations are publicized and can influence 
the decision-makers. When invited to participate upstream in the R&D phase, ra-
ther than downstream when innovations enter the market, assessors may prompt 
decisions in science policy and the imposition of new regulations. 
Upstream technology assessment is not the only role that citizens can play. In 
hybrid forums, citizens are invited to cooperate in the construction of knowledge; 
they become legitimate co-producers of knowledge (Callon 1999, Callon et al. 
2001). They are mobilized not only as individuals who volunteer to improve tech-
nology or to augment knowledge, but also on the basis of political activism. A 
number of NGOs, environmentalist movements, patient groups and consumer as-
sociations have set up their own laboratories and research facilities to produce 
their own expertise on specific issues such as medical research, radioactive con-
tamination and genetic adulteration. They thus renew the tradition of 19th century 
advocates of popular science as an alternative science, such as Auguste Comte, 
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François Raspail and Victor Meunier (Bensaude-Vincent 1988). Their mission is 
not exactly the social control of science that 19th century science popularizers en-
visaged, but is something like a surveillance of experts. Their frequent claims of 
‘independent expertise’ suggest that the knowledge produced by scientists is not 
independent, loaded as it is with public or private interests. However, that phrase 
is misleading because the knowledge produced by active citizens is neither value-
free nor disinterested. It is through the confrontation of various experts that one 
can expect to approximate the truth.  
It is too early to evaluate the impacts of such dispositifs on science and society. 
To be sure, science and technology have entered the public arena and are dis-
cussed in the agora, but it would be naive to think that a couple of hybrid forums 
and citizen panels alone have the ability to put science and opinion on an equal 
footing. Public participation remains confined to a very limited set of technoscien-
tific issues. Citizens’ interventions in the process of decision-making have so far 
been extremely limited, and the citizen panels are by no means representative of 
the public opinion because activists are systematically discarded. Often the moti-
vations for engaging the public upstream are to prevent the public rejection of new 
technologies, to avoid controversy and to foster public acceptance of innovations. 
Is it social engineering or participatory democracy? 
More precisely, the governanceof science by bringing together the ‘stakehold-
ers’ at a round table is inspired by a management technique initially developed in 
industrial companies. In this model, the norms of management—success, efficien-
cy—replace the normativity of law as well as the normativity of science (Bruno 
2008:75–76). The same managerial inspiration prevails in the role assigned to the 
social scientists engaged upstream in research programmes. They have to antici-
pate the potential impacts of new technologies on ethics, the economy, society and 
law. They have to identify key issues and potential risks, to balance costs and ben-
efits, and so on. In other words, they have to adopt the instrumental rationality that 
prevails in science and technology. This appears to be a technocratic control of so-
ciety as much as a democratic control of science and technology.  
In conclusion, the relations between science and opinion have been continuous-
ly reconfigured since the dawn of western science in Greece. However, it would 
be simplistic to conclude that we have shifted from a deficit model of the public as 
those who do not know to a democratic model of active citizens participating in 
the advancement of science. 
The emerging participatory model has not yet prevailed over the deficit model. 
Many scientists and citizens are still convinced that there is an increasing gulf be-
tween science and the public, and that laypeople cannot have an opinion about sci-
entific choices. The deficit model that prevailed in the 20th century did not eradi-
cate the earlier model of the enlightened public. There have been no paradigm 
shifts, although novel characterizations of the public emerge continuously. New 




Many rival images of science and the public are competing in today’s society. 
Through this perpetual struggle, science and the public are mutually shaped and 
reshaped. Their interactions or isolation determine the role of science in society 
and the public attitude towards science. 
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